Improperly-stored rail disrupts Red Line, causes single-tracking
Four hours of single-tracking on the Red Line on Wednesday, July 31 was caused by improperly-stored rail that had just been replaced, according to Metro radio transmissions analyzed by Metro Reasons. Equipment on a train came into contact with the rail just after 5:30 am which brought down power to the tracks, and led to disruptions throughout Wednesday's rush hour.
Metro scheduled a nightly trackwork area during the week of July 29th through August 1st between Fort Totten to Takoma in order to perform 'rail renewal ' - that is, replacing the rails ("tracks") which trains run on top of. The work area for the evening of July 30th was scheduled to begin at 10pm, and the Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) requested the area on time at 9:12pm.
The overnight work ran late for unknown reason, and Metro began single-tracking around Fort Totten via the outbound track (towards Glenmont) while crews finished up. The first inbound train single-tracked around Fort Totten via the outbound track at 5:17am.
After the Track and Structures (TRST) crew finished their work, an Automatic Train Control (ATC) crew was given access to the trackbed in order to perform "track circuit verification." Metro's ATC system uses track circuits to govern the movement of trains, how closely they're spaced, and how fast they can go. A track circuit malfunction can cause trains to lose "speed commands" and come to a stop before being allowed to proceed only at a slow speed.
Once train 101 arrived at Fort Totten, the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) reported that 3rd rail power, which is used to power trains, had gone down unexpectedly. This indicated that the track inspection was not normal and that something was amiss. Needless to say, single-tracking did not conclude. The operator of train 101 was instructed to offload the train.
The operator of train 101, a rail supervisor, the RWIC, and several other Metro personnel performed a "ground walkaround" of the train checking the cars, rails, and train underbody for anything that might have caused 3rd rail power to go down.
Just after 6am the ROCC radio controller on duty asked the RWIC of the overnight work area where the rail they had stashed for removal was stored; the RWIC responded that the rail was between the two running rails closer to the Fort Totten platform.
A Railcar Maintenance (CMNT) employee on duty at the station around the same time had been instructed to call the ROCC, likely so that the ROCC controllers could explain what was going on. The CMNT employee joined the other workers on the trackbed and began disabling the power systems on the train by throwing what's called a "knife switch" on each car in the eight-car consist. He was unable to do this on the entire consist because the switches on some cars were blocked by the station platform.
The likely cause of the loss of 3rd rail power was identified at 6:19am, when the CMNT employee identified power equipment on railcar 7206 (the "collector shoes," which feed power from the 3rd rail onto the train itself) that was touching the spare running rail. This likely caused a power short leading to breakers in the 3rd rail system to open in order to prevent damage. Once identified, the Metro workers began attempting to create space between the train and the running rail so that they could restore 3rd rail power, move the train, and end single-tracking.
The ROCC restored 3rd rail power to the inbound track at Fort Totten around 6:30am and train 701 briefly moved before being instructed to stop due to smoke coming from the train. The CMNT employee went back to the roadway to cut all the remaining knife switches from the trailing four cars of the train; these cars were then electronically and physically isolated from the lead four cars of the train to keep the brakes from being engaged so the train could resume moving.
Train 101 - now train 701 - was finally able to move off the Fort Totten platform at around 7:30am after some additional troubleshooting was performed in order to get the train moving when it appeared that the train was failing to keep its brakes released*.
After moving train 701 out of the Fort Totten platform area, the RWIC and his crew went to the roadway to safely move the spare rail out of the way so that it wouldn't come into contact with any more trains and trigger another loss of 3rd rail power. This process began just before 8am.
At around 9am, the RWIC in the area let the ROCC know that the track crew was done in the trackbed and that 3rd rail power could be restored in order to end single-tracking. An empty test train was sent through Fort Totten at 9:06am, and single-tracking was concluded shortly after.
Service impact
At least four trains were offloaded and turned back around for service during the incident. 10,675 passengers received a Metro Rush Hour Promise credit. Riders saw delays up to about about 20 minutes at the incident's worst.
* 7000-series trains automatically apply holding brakes whenever the train is powered down. If these brakes don't properly release when the train is powered back up, the friction between the brakes and the wheels can create smoke.
ChronologyThat surely was some long *scheduled* maintenance. Rush hour is a DISASTER this morning (9 hours later)! pic.twitter.com/G5VtCgdN3H— Jordan Dale (@FrankJordanDale) July 31, 2019
Metro scheduled a nightly trackwork area during the week of July 29th through August 1st between Fort Totten to Takoma in order to perform 'rail renewal ' - that is, replacing the rails ("tracks") which trains run on top of. The work area for the evening of July 30th was scheduled to begin at 10pm, and the Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) requested the area on time at 9:12pm.
The overnight work ran late for unknown reason, and Metro began single-tracking around Fort Totten via the outbound track (towards Glenmont) while crews finished up. The first inbound train single-tracked around Fort Totten via the outbound track at 5:17am.
After the Track and Structures (TRST) crew finished their work, an Automatic Train Control (ATC) crew was given access to the trackbed in order to perform "track circuit verification." Metro's ATC system uses track circuits to govern the movement of trains, how closely they're spaced, and how fast they can go. A track circuit malfunction can cause trains to lose "speed commands" and come to a stop before being allowed to proceed only at a slow speed.
After the ATC crew finished up their work, Red Line train 101 was instructed to perform a track inspection from Takoma inbound to Fort Totten. The train arrived at Fort Totten at approximately 5:37am.For context, here's a graph of cumulative train delays on the Red Line during morning rush hours so far this year, where today's spike is the one all the way on the right side. The black line is the median, serving as a baseline for comparison. #wmata pic.twitter.com/OHam0LHTAn— MetroHero (@dcmetrohero) July 31, 2019
Once train 101 arrived at Fort Totten, the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) reported that 3rd rail power, which is used to power trains, had gone down unexpectedly. This indicated that the track inspection was not normal and that something was amiss. Needless to say, single-tracking did not conclude. The operator of train 101 was instructed to offload the train.
The operator of train 101, a rail supervisor, the RWIC, and several other Metro personnel performed a "ground walkaround" of the train checking the cars, rails, and train underbody for anything that might have caused 3rd rail power to go down.
Just after 6am the ROCC radio controller on duty asked the RWIC of the overnight work area where the rail they had stashed for removal was stored; the RWIC responded that the rail was between the two running rails closer to the Fort Totten platform.
A Railcar Maintenance (CMNT) employee on duty at the station around the same time had been instructed to call the ROCC, likely so that the ROCC controllers could explain what was going on. The CMNT employee joined the other workers on the trackbed and began disabling the power systems on the train by throwing what's called a "knife switch" on each car in the eight-car consist. He was unable to do this on the entire consist because the switches on some cars were blocked by the station platform.
The likely cause of the loss of 3rd rail power was identified at 6:19am, when the CMNT employee identified power equipment on railcar 7206 (the "collector shoes," which feed power from the 3rd rail onto the train itself) that was touching the spare running rail. This likely caused a power short leading to breakers in the 3rd rail system to open in order to prevent damage. Once identified, the Metro workers began attempting to create space between the train and the running rail so that they could restore 3rd rail power, move the train, and end single-tracking.
The ROCC restored 3rd rail power to the inbound track at Fort Totten around 6:30am and train 701 briefly moved before being instructed to stop due to smoke coming from the train. The CMNT employee went back to the roadway to cut all the remaining knife switches from the trailing four cars of the train; these cars were then electronically and physically isolated from the lead four cars of the train to keep the brakes from being engaged so the train could resume moving.
Train 101 - now train 701 - was finally able to move off the Fort Totten platform at around 7:30am after some additional troubleshooting was performed in order to get the train moving when it appeared that the train was failing to keep its brakes released*.
After moving train 701 out of the Fort Totten platform area, the RWIC and his crew went to the roadway to safely move the spare rail out of the way so that it wouldn't come into contact with any more trains and trigger another loss of 3rd rail power. This process began just before 8am.
At around 9am, the RWIC in the area let the ROCC know that the track crew was done in the trackbed and that 3rd rail power could be restored in order to end single-tracking. An empty test train was sent through Fort Totten at 9:06am, and single-tracking was concluded shortly after.
Service impact
At least four trains were offloaded and turned back around for service during the incident. 10,675 passengers received a Metro Rush Hour Promise credit. Riders saw delays up to about about 20 minutes at the incident's worst.
* 7000-series trains automatically apply holding brakes whenever the train is powered down. If these brakes don't properly release when the train is powered back up, the friction between the brakes and the wheels can create smoke.
